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11 Introduction
When a ﬁrm goes bankrupt, how should its liquidation value be divided among its creditors? If
a person dies and the debts left behind are found to exceed the worth of her estate, how should
the estate be divided? If a certain amount of money should be collected from a population,
how much should each individual contribute? How should medical triage be designed, when the
available resources are not suﬃcient to cover individual needs? These questions are examples
of the so-called problems of adjudicating conﬂicting claims. There is an extensive literature
(see Herrero and Villar (2001), Moulin (2002) or Thomson (2003) for recent surveys) dealing
with the formal analysis of these problems following O’Neill’s (1982) seminal contribution. The
objective of this literature is to identify well-behaved “rules” to ﬁx, for each problem, the
appropriate division among the claimants of the available amount.
There are three rules that emerge from this literature. The proportional rule, which chooses
awards proportional to claims, is inspired by Aristotle’s Maxim (“Equals should be treated
equally, and unequals, unequally in proportion to relevant similarities and diﬀerences”), proba-
bly the oldest formal principle of distributive justice. Two other rules, that can be traced back
to Maimonides, are the so-called constrained equal awards rule and constrained equal losses
rule. The former distributes the available amount equally, provided no agent ends up with
more than she claims; the latter rule imposes equal losses for all the agents with one proviso:
no one should obtain a negative amount. Besides their long tradition, these three rules are
the most common methods employed for solving practical problems.1 Furthermore, they are
the only ones that satisfy the four basic invariance axioms within the family of rules that treat
equal claims equally (e.g., Moulin, 2000). On the other hand, no compelling theoretical argu-
ment has been found so far to select, among these rules a unique optimal solution to adjudicate
conﬂicting claims. On the contrary, theory (and standard practice) appeal to one or another
depending on the economic context at stake.
The aim of this paper is to bring this interesting theoretical debate into an experimental
lab. Our main question here can be summarized as follows:
Is there any particular rule that is salient in subjects’ perception
of the optimal solution to a problem of adjudicating conﬂicting claims?
To answer this question, two lines of research are open. One, which is very much in line
with the axiomatic approach, is to put subjects in front of hypothetical problems and ask them
1The proportional rule is generally employed to ration shareholders in bankruptcy regulations (e.g., Hart,
1999; Kaminski, 2006). The constrained equal awards rule makes good sense, for instance, in problems of
estate division (e.g., Aumann and Maschler, 1985). The constrained equal losses rule is appealing in the case
of tax schemes, as it looks for the most egalitarian after-tax income distribution. It is also a natural procedure
for cases in which claims are related to needs, as in the case of public support of health care expenses (e.g.,
Cuadras-Morat´ o et al., 2001).
2to solve them from the point of view of an outside observer; the other is to fully exploit the
experimental methodology and provide subjects with an active role to solve the claim problem.
This is to say, to design hypothetical situations in which they are actual claimants rather than
mere outside observers. The results of such an experiment may provide experimental evidence
on how agents play when they are personally involved in real conﬂicting claim problems.
The experimental methodology we have just mentioned is more in line with the so-called
non-cooperative approach to conﬂicting claims problems (e.g., Chun, 1989; Dagan et al., 1997).
This approach applies to these problems the same methodology known as the Nash program
for the theory of bargaining, by which speciﬁc procedures are constructed as non-cooperative
games with the property that the unique equilibrium allocation corresponds to the one dictated
by a speciﬁc rule (e.g., Nash, 1953; Binmore et al., 1992; Roemer, 1996). In other words,
this approach provides theoretical support to certain rules by constructing speciﬁc strategic
situations, for which such rules are self-enforcing.
In this paper we collect both survey and experimental evidence, and the results we obtain
should be considered as complementary. We ﬁrst selected 300 students to play in the lab
a sequence of games corresponding to three (non-cooperative) procedures proposed by the
literature. These procedures share the same game-form and display very similar strategic
properties: there is always a player with a weakly dominant strategy (that corresponds to each
of the three rules we are considering) by which she can force an outcome of the game in her
favor. Thus, if subjects recognize the strategic incentives induced by each game, the choice of a
particular procedure may be equivalent to the choice of a particular rule to solve the problem.
We then consider an additional procedure, (a simple “majority game”), which has the
property that all (and only those) strategy proﬁles in which all players coordinate on the same
rule constitute a strict Nash equilibrium. This additional game has no selection incentives, but
coordination incentives only. Thus, we used this game to investigate more compellingly the
rule selection issue.
Since the speciﬁc contexts are so important in all practical cases of adjudicating claims,
we also checked whether subjects participating in games with such strong strategic properties
would be sensitive to framing eﬀects. To this purpose, in some sessions we explained to subjects
each procedure with a diﬀerent “story”, somehow consistent with the rule supported by the
procedure. We then compared the results with the evidence of some (control) sessions in
which the same procedures were played under a completely “unframed” scenario, in which only
monetary payoﬀs associated to strategy proﬁles were provided. We did so to see whether a
frame may have induced subjects to behave diﬀerently.
The main ﬁndings of this experiment can be summarized as follows. While in the ﬁrst
three procedures subjects’ play easily converges to the unique equilibrium rule even in the
ﬁrst rounds, in the majority procedure the proportional rule overwhelmingly prevails as a
coordination device. As for the framing issue, we ﬁnd that frames aﬀect subjects’ behavior
3only in the majority procedure. By contrast, for the other procedures, strategic considerations
appear to be too compelling to render framing eﬀects relevant.
The alternative approach consisted of administering a questionnaire to a diﬀerent group of
164 students. These students were asked to choose their preferred rule from the viewpoint of
an arbitrator in charge of resolving, among others, the same problem played out previously
in the lab by the other group of subjects. Consistently with our experimental ﬁndings, the
proportional solution prevailed as the modal choice for 90% of the respondents. Nonetheless,
they also proved to be sensitive to the particular situation at hand, meaning that framing eﬀects
do also occur here.
Despite the extensive experimental literature on related issues such as bargaining (see, for in-
stance, Ochs and Roth (1989), and the literature cited therein), or arbitration (see, for instance,
Ashenfelter and Bloom (1984), Ashenfelter et al. (1992), and the literature cited therein), this
is, to the best of our knowledge, the ﬁrst experiment on problems of adjudicating conﬂicting
claims. The closest reference to our work is G¨ achter and Riedl’s (2004) experimental paper. In
their independently conducted work, they also combine surveys and standard laboratory exper-
iments. However, diﬀerently to ours, in their experiment subjects did not follow any speciﬁed
protocol, but had to negotiate an agreement in a symmetric free-form bargaining game.2 As
for the comparison with our ﬁndings, their questionnaire leads to results quite similar to ours
(i.e., the proportional rule prevails), while in the experiment, ﬁnal agreements were closer to
the solution proposed by the constrained equal awards rule.3
The remainder of this paper is arranged as follows. In Section 2, we set up the model,
while in Section 3, we present the design of the experiment. In Section 4, we report on our
experimental results, whereas in Section 5, we report on the results of the questionnaire. Our
conclusions, comments and further proposals are then presented in Section 6. The latter is
followed by an Appendix containing the proofs of some theoretical results related to our study
and the instructions for the experiment and the questionnaire.
2Also, in the questionnaire, subjects were not constrained in their choice by the three rules object of this
paper, but they could allocate the available amount between the two hypothetical claimants any way they
wanted. In addition, they only deal with 2-player problems.
3Another related work is that of Cuadras-Morat´ o et al. (2001). They investigate, by way of questionnaires,
the equity properties of diﬀerent rules in the context of health care problems. In this regard, they ﬁnd that when
asked to choose from among six potential allocations, (including the solution proposed by the proportional and
the constrained equal losses rules), using the perspective of an “impartial judge” in the context of health care
problems, subjects displayed a slight preference for the constrained equal losses rule. Bosmans and Schokkaert
(2007) is another (more recent) related paper whose main concern is to study the within-context consistency
and between-context uniformity of individual responses (in diﬀerent questionnaires) for claims problems. See
also the papers of Yaari and Bar-Hillel (1984) and Frolich et al. (1987), in which diﬀerent bargaining solutions
are also investigated by means of questionnaires.
42 The model
Let N = {1,2,...,n} be a set of agents with generic elements i and j. A problem of adjudicating
conﬂicting claims is a pair (c,E), where E>0 represents the amount to divide, and c ∈ Rn
+ is a
vector of claims whose ith component is ci, with
￿
i∈N ci >E . In words, ci is the claim of agent
i on a certain amount (the estate) E. We denote by B the family of all those problems. We
assume, without loss of generality, that agents are ordered by claims, so that c1 ≥ c2 ≥ ... ≥ cn.
In the remainder of the paper, we shall refer to agent 1 (n), that is, the agent with the highest
(lowest) claim, as the highest (lowest) claimant.
A rule is a mapping r : B → Rn that associates a unique allocation r(c,E) with every
problem (c,E) such that:




(iii) For all i,j ∈ N, if ci ≥ cj then ri(c,E) ≥ rj(c,E) and ci − ri(c,E) ≥ cj − rj(c,E).
The allocation r(c,E) is interpreted as a desirable way of dividing E among the agents in
N. Requirement (i) is that each agent receives an award that is non-negative and bounded
above by her claim. Requirement (ii) is that the entire amount must be allocated. Finally,
requirement (iii) is that agents with higher claims receive higher awards and face higher losses.4
We denote the set of all such rules by R.
We then introduce the three rules object of our study. The constrained equal awards rule
makes awards as equal as possible, subject to no agent receiving more than her claim. The
proportional rule distributes awards proportionally to claims. The constrained equal losses rule
makes losses as equal as possible, subject to the condition that no agent ends up with a negative
award.
The constrained equal awards rule, cea, selects for all (c,E) ∈ B, the vector (min{ci,λ})i∈N,
where λ > 0 is chosen so that
￿
i∈N min{ci,λ} = E .
The proportional rule, p, selects for all (c,E) ∈ B, the vector λc, where λ is chosen so that
￿
i∈N λci = E.
The constrained equal losses rule, cel, selects for all (c,E) ∈ B, the vector (max{0,c i −
λ})i∈N, where λ > 0 is chosen so that
￿
i∈N max{0,c i − λ} = E.
Remark. Note that for all (c,E) ∈ B and all r ∈ R, cel1(c,E) ≥ r1(c,E) and cean(c,E) ≥
rn(c,E). In other words, cel (cea) is the rule preferred by the highest (lowest) claimant
among all of the rules belonging to R.
4While conditions (i) and (ii) are standard in the deﬁnition of a rule, requirement (iii) is considered in the
literature as an independent axiom called order preservation, and any rule satisfying condition (iii) is said to
belong to the set of order-preserving rules. Since all of the rules stipulated for our experiment satisfy condition
(iii), we shall abuse standard terminology by referring to order-preserving rules as simply “rules”.
5We now present three noncooperative procedures proposed to solve claims problems.
In the diminishing claims procedure, if agents do not agree on a particular rule, then their
claims are reduced by substituting them with the highest amount assigned to every agent by
the chosen rules. Agents’ rules are then applied to the resulting problem after claims have been
adjusted. If the chosen rules coincide in their allocation to the new problem, the procedure
stops. Otherwise, claims are reduced again, and if the process does not converge in a ﬁnite
number of steps, the limit of the resulting claims vectors (if it exists) is chosen as solution to
the problem. Otherwise, nobody gets anything. Formally,
The diminishing claims procedure (P1) [Chun (1989)]. Let (c,E) ∈ B be given. Each
player i ∈ N chooses a rule ri ∈ R, with r−i denoting the strategy proﬁle selected by i’s
opponents. Let r = {ri,r −i} be the proﬁle of the reported rules. The division proposed by the
diminishing claims procedure, dc[r,(c,E)] is obtained as follows:
Step 1. Let c1 = c. For all i ∈ N, calculate ri(c1,E). If ri(c1,E)=rj(c1,E), for all i,j ∈ N,
then dc[r,(c,E)] = ri(c1,E). Otherwise, move on to the next step.







. For all j ∈ N, calculate rj(c2,E). If
ri(c2,E)=rj(c2,E), for all i,j ∈ N, then dc[r,(c,E)] = ri(c2,E). Otherwise, move on to the
next step.








. For all j ∈ N, calculate rj(ck+1,E)
. If rj(ck+1,E)=ri(ck+1,E), for all i,j ∈ N, then dc[r,(c,E)] = ri(ck+1,E). Otherwise, move
on to the next step.
If the previous process does not end in a ﬁnite number of steps, then:




then x∗ = dc[r,(c,E)]. Otherwise, dc[r,(c,E)] = 0.
In the proportional concessions procedure, if agents do not agree on the proposed rule, then
they receive the proportional share of half of the estate. Agents’ rules are then applied to divide
the remainder after adjusting claims. If the chosen rules coincide in their allocation to the new
problem, then the procedure stops. Otherwise, the process starts all over again. If it does not
converge within a ﬁnite number of steps, the limit of the aggregation of concessions (if it exists)
is then chosen as solution to the problem. Otherwise, nobody gets anything. Formally,
The proportional concessions procedure (P2) [Moreno-Ternero (2002)]. Let (c,E) ∈ B be
given. Each player i ∈ N chooses a rule ri ∈ R, with r−i denoting the strategy proﬁle selected
by i’s opponents. Let r = {ri,r −i} be the proﬁle of rules reported. The division proposed by
the proportional concessions procedure, pc[r,(c,E)], is obtained as follows:
Step 1. Let c1 = c and E1 = E. For all i ∈ N, calculate ri(c1,E1). If ri(c1,E1)=rj(c1,E1),
for all i,j ∈ N, then pc[r,(c,E)] = ri(c1,E1). Otherwise, move on to the next step.
6Step 2. For all i ∈ N, let m1
i = pi(c1, E1
2 ), c2 = c1 − m1, where m1 =( m1
i)i∈N, and




2 . For all i ∈ N, calculate ri(c2,E2). If ri(c2,E2)=rj(c2,E2), for all
i,j ∈ N, then pc[r(c,E)] = m1 + ri(c2,E2). Otherwise, move on to the next step.
Step k+1. For all i ∈ N, let mk
i = pi(ck, Ek





For all i ∈ N, calculate ri(ck+1,Ek+1). If ri(ck+1,Ek+1)=rj(ck+1,Ek+1), for all i,j ∈ N, then
pc[r,(c,E)] = m1 + ···+ mk + ri(ck+1,Ek+1). Otherwise, move on to the next step.
If the previous process does not end in a ﬁnite number of steps, then:
Limit case. Compute limk→∞(m1 + ···+ mk). If it converges to an allocation x∗ such that
￿
i∈N x∗
i ≤ E, then x∗ = pc[r,(c,E)]. Otherwise, pc[r,(c,E)] = 0.
In the unanimous concessions procedure, if agents do not agree on the rule proposed, they
receive the minimum amount assigned by the chosen rules. Agents’ rules are then applied to
the residual problem, after adjusting claims and the liquidation value. If the chosen rules agree
on the allocation for the new problem, then the procedure stops. Otherwise, the process starts
all over again. If it does not end in a ﬁnite number of steps, the limit of the aggregation of
minimal concessions (if it exists) is then chosen as the solution to the problem. Otherwise,
nobody gets anything. Formally,
The unanimous concessions procedure (P3) [Herrero (2003)]. Let (c,E) ∈ B be given.
Each player i ∈ N chooses a rule ri ∈ R, with r−i denoting the strategy proﬁle selected by
i’s opponents. Let r = {ri,r −i} be the proﬁle of rules reported. The division proposed by the
unanimous concessions procedure, u[r,(c,E)] is obtained as follows:
Step 1. Let c1 = c and E1 = E. For all j ∈ N, calculate rj(c1,E1). If ri(c1,E1)=rj(c1,E1),
for all i,j ∈ N, then u[r,(c,E)] = ri(c1,E1). Otherwise, move on to the next step.







, E2 = E1−
￿
i∈N m1
i, and c2 = c1−m1,
where m1 =( m1
i)i∈N. For all i ∈ N, calculate ri(c2,E2). If ri(c2,E2)=rj(c2,E2), for all
i,j ∈ N, then u[r,(c,E)] = m1 + ri(c2,E2). Otherwise, move on to the next step.











ck+1 = ck − mk. For all i ∈ N, calculate ri(ck+1,Ek+1). If ri(ck+1,Ek+1)=rj(ck+1,Ek+1), for
all i,j ∈ N, then u[r,(c,E)] = m1 +···+mk +ri(ck+1,Ek+1). Otherwise, move on to the next
step.
If the previous process does not end in a ﬁnite number of steps, then
Limit case. Compute limk→∞(m1 + ···+ mk). If it converges to an allocation x∗ such that
￿
i∈N x∗
i ≤ E, then x∗ = u[r,(c,E)]. Otherwise, u[r,(c,E)] = 0.
The strategic properties of these procedures have already been explored in the literature,
as the following lemma shows.
7Lemma 1 (Chun, 1989; Moreno-Ternero, 2002; Herrero, 2003) The following statements
hold:
(i) If, for some i ∈ N, ri = cea, then dc[r,(c,E)] = cea(c,E). Furthermore, in game P1,
cea is a weakly dominant strategy for the lowest claimant and all Nash equilibria are outcome
equivalent to cea.
(ii) If, for some i ∈ N, ri = p, then pc[r,(c,E)] = p(c,E). Furthermore, in game P2, if
there exists an agent whose preferred allocation is p, then p is a weakly dominant strategy for
her. Finally, all Nash equilibria of P2 are outcome equivalent to p.
(iii) If, for some i ∈ N, ri = cel, then u[r,(c,E)] = cel(c,E). Furthermore, in game P3, cel
is a weakly dominant strategy for the highest claimant and all Nash equilibria of P3 are outcome
equivalent to cel.
The basic message of Lemma 1 is that the three procedures selected do not seem to aﬀord
the agents any freedom of choice, at least under very mild (ﬁrst-order) rationality conditions.
This is so because there is always some player (the identity of whom depends on the procedure)
who can force the outcome in her favor by selecting her weakly dominant strategy. This may
render these procedures inadequate if we were genuinely interested in the rule selection problem,
that is, in collecting experimental evidence on how subjects reach an agreement in the lab. This
is why we also consider an additional procedure which takes the form of a coordination game,
which we call the majority procedure P0.
In P0, a claimant obtains the share of the liquidation value proposed by her chosen rule
only if it has been selected by simple majority (that is, all other rules have been chosen by a
strictly smaller number of agents). Otherwise, she is ﬁned by ε > 0. More precisely:
Majority procedure (P0). Let (c,E) ∈ B be given. Each player i ∈ N chooses simultaneously
a rule ri ∈ R, with r−i denoting the strategy proﬁle selected by i’s opponents. The payoﬀ









i (c,E) if ri is the rule selected by a simple majority;
−ε otherwise.
The strategic properties of this procedure are contained in the following lemma, the (trivial)
proof of which is omitted here.
Lemma 2 The set of strict Nash equilibria of P0 is {(r,r,...,r):r ∈ R}.
3 Experimental design
In what follows, we describe in detail the main design features of our experimental study.
83.1 Subjects
Our experiment was conducted in 25 computerized sessions.5 A total of 300 students (12
students per session) were recruited among the undergraduate population at the University of
Alicante. Our experimental subjects were mainly Economics students, with no (or very little)
prior exposure to game theory.
3.2 Frames
We ran 15 framed and 10 unframed sessions. As for the former, the claim problem was framed
in three diﬀerent ways, depending on the procedure being employed. The idea was to provide
a framework consistent with the (equilibrium) rule induced by the procedure. All frames had
the common feature that the problem was presented by the hypothetical situation of a bank
going bankrupt.
• Frame 1: Depositors. Within this framework, the claimants are all bank depositors.
In such a case, common-sense (and common practice) gives priority to the smaller claims
(i.e., the smaller deposits), as it occurs (in equilibrium) with procedure P1.
• Frame 2: Shareholders. Within this framework, the claimants are all shareholders of
the bank. This is the typical situation in which, in case of a bankruptcy, each shareholder
usually obtains a share of the liquidation value that is proportional to the number of
shares of the bank’s stock she holds, as occurs (in equilibrium) with procedure P2.
• Frame 3: Non-governmental organizations. In our last framework, claimants are
non-governmental organizations (NGO) sponsored by the bank. We here assumed that the
NGO had signed a contract with the bank before its bankruptcy, according to which it
would receive a contribution according with its social relevance (i.e., the higher the social
relevance, the higher the contribution). Within such a framework, it would seem appro-
priate to give priority to higher claimants, as it occurs (in equilibrium) with procedure
P3.
• Frame 0: No frame (NO). We also ran 10 unframed sessions. In this case, subjects were
only provided with monetary payoﬀ tables and were required to play the four protocols
without any story behind.
3.3 Treatments
In the framed sessions, subjects were randomly assigned to groups of 3 individuals each and
played twenty rounds of a framed procedure, P1, P2 or P3, followed by twenty rounds of P0
5The experiment was programmed and conducted using the experimental software z-Tree (Fischbacher,
2007).
9presented under the same frame. In the unframed sessions, subjects played twenty rounds of
each of the four procedures, P1, P2, P3 (in diﬀerent order, depending on the treatment), followed
by P0, without any framework. Table 1 reports on the precise sequencing of the 25 sessions.
Treatments T1 T2 T3 T4 T5 T6 T7 T8
P1 P2 P3 P1 P3 P2 P2 P3
P0 P0 P0 P2 P2 P1 P3 P1
P3 P1 P3 P1 P2
P0 P0 P0 P0 P0
Number of sessions 5 5 5 2 2 2 2 2
Frame Framed Unframed
(1)
Table 1: Sequential structure of the experimental sessions
As Table 1 shows, all (un)framed treatments consist of a sequence of (four) two procedures. In
all framed and unframed sessions, our procedure P0 was played last. This was to check whether
the convergence properties of P0 were conditioned on the frame (in the framed sessions) or
the order of preceding procedures (in the unframed sessions). As it turns out (see footnote 11
below), this was not the case. The framed sessions lasted for approximately 45’, whereas the
unframed ones lasted about 70’. In all sessions, subjects played anonymously in groups of three
players with randomly matched opponents. Subjects were informed that their player position
(i.e., their individual claims in the problem) would remain constant throughout the session,
while the composition of their group would change at every round.
Instructions were provided by a self-paced, interactive computer program that introduced
and described the experiment. Subjects were also given a written copy of the instructions
(identical to those that appeared on the screen), and of the payoﬀ table associated with the
procedure being played.6 At the end of each round, subjects were informed about the outcome
of the game and the monetary payoﬀ associated with it.
3.4 The claims problem
All monetary payoﬀs in the experiment were expressed in Spanish Pesetas (1 euro is approx.
166 Spanish Pesetas).7 As we mentioned earlier, all four procedures were constructed upon the
6Instructions were presented in Spanish. The complete set of instructions, translated into English, can be
found in the Appendix.
7It is standard practice for all experiments ran in Alicante to use Spanish Pesetas as experimental currency.
The reason for this design choice is twofold. First, it mitigates integer problems, compared with other currencies
(USD or Euros, for example). On the other hand, although Spanish Pesetas are no longer in use (substituted
10same problem (c∗,E∗), where c∗ = (49, 46, 5) (i.e.,
￿
ci = 100) and E∗ = 20. The resulting




Since, in all of the sessions, subjects played more than one procedure in sequence, we
decided to focus on a single problem to reduce the variability in the environment and facilitate
subjects’ understanding of the strategic situation in which they were involved. The main
motivation for the choice of the particular problem (c∗,E∗) was to provide each claimant with
a strictly preferred allocation associated with one of the three rules. We already know, from
our Remark, that, for all rules belonging to R, cel (cea) is the most preferred rule of the highest
(lowest) claimant, independently of the particular problem in hand. However, this does not
guarantee that p will be the most preferred rule for any middle claimant, unless we imposed
some conditions that are formally presented in the Appendix.
3.5 Game-forms and payoﬀs
As we mentioned earlier, all procedures share the same game-form. In each session, each
player was assigned to a player position, corresponding to a particular claim in the problem
(c∗,E∗), with c∗
i denoting player i’s claim. In each round, each player was required to choose
simultaneously a rule from among cea, p and cel. Round payoﬀs were determined by the ruling
procedure.
One of our most delicate design choices was just how to construct the (monetary) payoﬀ
functions for our experiment. In a standard experimental session, subjects participate in a
speciﬁc “role-game” protocol after which they receive a certain amount of money as a function
of how well they (and the other subjects in the pool) have played the game. In other words,
subjects who participate in an economic experiment win money. However, in real-life claims
situations, claimants lose money, in the sense that they get back less than what they have paid
(or had the right to be repaid) sometime in the past.
To some extent, the simple fact that subjects must leave the experimental lab with more
money than what they had at the time they arrived may be considered incompatible with the
possibility of running an experiment on claims problems. To (at least partially) ameliorate this
dilemma, we constructed our monetary payoﬀ functions in such a way that, in each round, (out
of a predetermined endowment, known in advance), subjects were losing the diﬀerence between
by the Euro in the year 2002), Spanish people still use Pesetas to express monetary values in their everyday life.
In this respect, by using a “real” (as opposed to an artiﬁcial) currency, we avoid the problem of framing the
incentive structure of the experiment using a scale (e.g., “Experimental Currency”) with no cognitive content.
11their claim and the award assigned to them, given the ruling procedure and the group’s strategy
proﬁle.
More precisely, rule allocations in the experiment were constructed as follows:
cea(c∗,E∗) − c∗ = (7.5,7.5,5) − (49,46,5) = (−41.5,−38.5,0).
p(c∗,E∗) − c∗ = (9.8,9.2,1) − (49,46,5) = (−39.2,−36.8,−4).
cel(c∗,E∗) − c∗ = (11.5,8.5,0) − (49,46,5) = (−37.5,−37.5,−5).
By the same token, the payoﬀ matrix associated to procedure P1, as shown in Table 2, only
contains non-positive amounts.
(2)
Table 2: Procedure P1
Table 2 is identical to the one used to explain procedure P1 to subjects. Player 1 (2) [3]
selects the row (column) [matrix]. Each cell contains the monetary payoﬀs, for the three players,
associated to each strategy proﬁle.
The payoﬀs were obtained as follows: From Lemma 1, if ri = cea for some i ∈ {1,2,3}, then
the allocation is cea(c∗,E∗)−c∗ =( −41.5,−38.5,0). If ri = rj for all i ￿= j then the allocation
is ri(c∗,E∗)−c∗. The allocations of the remaining six proﬁles were obtained using the recursive
algorithm based on the deﬁnition of P1 that leads to (10.7,8.4,0.9)−c∗ =( −38.3,−37.6,−4.1).
As we know from Lemma 1, every procedure provides a player (the identity of whom de-
pends on the procedure) with a weakly dominant strategy by which she can force her preferred
outcome. In each game, we refer to such a player as the pivotal player in that game. For P1, the
pivotal player is player 3 (the lowest claimant), whose weakly dominant strategy corresponds
to rule cea.
Analogous considerations hold for P2 and P3 whose payoﬀ matrices are drawn in Tables 3
and 4 respectively.
(3)
Table 3: Procedure P2
(4)
Table 4: Procedure P3
Here we notice that p is a weakly dominant strategy in P2 for the pivotal player 2, whereas cel
is weakly dominant in P3 for the pivotal player 1.
As we can see from Tables 2-4, all situations where agents’ rules do not coincide (and no
agent selects the corresponding equilibrium rule) lead to a well-deﬁned limit in the division of
the liquidation value. In other words, the event of no convergence (associated with a 0 payoﬀ for
all players), contemplated in the deﬁnition of all three procedures, never occurs in our games.
12As it turns out, this is not a special feature of our speciﬁc parametrization of the claim problem
(c∗,E∗) -or the constraint on the set of rules or the number of players- but rather a general
property of all procedures, as the following proposition shows.
Proposition 1 For all (c,E) ∈ B and for all procedures, P1,P 2 and P3, the limit allocation
x∗ always exists.
Proof. In the Appendix.
The majority procedure, P0, displays rather diﬀerent strategic properties, as shown in Table
5.
(5)
Table 5: Procedure P0
Since this procedure yields basically a coordination game, no player has a weakly dominant
strategy. (Strict) Nash equilibria correspond to those proﬁles in which all players agree on the
same rule.
The payoﬀs for this game were obtained as follows. If ri = rj for all i ￿= j then the allocation






respectively whereas agent k gets −1 − c∗
k. Finally, if all agents propose diﬀerent rules, the
allocation is (−1,−1,−1) − c∗.
As we already mentioned, the payoﬀs reported in Tables 2-5 were subtracted from subjects’
endowments. Before playing a given procedure, all subjects received an initial endowment of
1000 pesetas in each session, from which all losses were subtracted during the 20 rounds. At
the beginning of each following procedure, subjects would receive a new endowment of 1000
pesetas, and so on. Furthermore, subjects who were selected as players 1 and 2 received 500
pesetas as a show-up fee in the framed sessions, and 1000 pesetas in the unframed sessions.
Subjects who were selected as players 3 did not receive any initial show-up fee, due to the fact
that their losses were considerably lower than the others’.8 As for procedure P0, the penalty
ε was equal to 1 peseta. Average earnings per hour were around 1800 pesetas (11 euros) for
players 1 and 2 and around 3600 pesetas (22 euros) for player 3.
4 Experimental results
In presenting our experimental evidence, we shall look ﬁrst at procedures P1 to P3 in Section 4.1.
Here we ﬁnd that, for each procedure, the corresponding equilibrium rule emerges from the very
beginning, independent of the framing conditions. By stark contrast, our majority procedure
8This asymmetry in the show-up fees, meant to provide also players 1 and 2 with the appropriate ﬁnancial
gain, was communicated privately to each subject, and as such, we shall read the data under the assumption
that it played no role in determining their decisions.
13P0 (Section 4.2) displays a signiﬁcantly lower rate of equilibrium outcomes and behavior, both
in framed and unframed sessions. Moreover, and more strikingly, in P0, whenever subjects
are able to coordinate on an equilibrium, they do so only under the proportional rule. This
evidence calls for further statistical analysis. Here we ﬁnd that, for procedure P0, both frame
and learning eﬀects are signiﬁcant in explaining outcomes and subjects’ aggregate behavior,
albeit to a diﬀerent extent across players’ positions.
4.1 Procedures P1 to P3
Table 6 reports the relative frequency of allocations which correspond to each rule for pro-
cedures P1, P2 and P3. The remaining category (labelled as “Others”) pools all allocations
that do not correspond to any particular rule. We begin by noting that virtually all matches
(both in the framed and in the unframed sessions) yielded the allocation associated with the
corresponding equilibrium rule (boldface in Table 6). We also know, from Lemma 1, that every
Nash equilibrium is outcome equivalent to the corresponding equilibrium rule. However, there
are also other strategy proﬁles which are not equilibria but which yield the same allocation (for
example, in the case of P1 if players 1 and 3 select rule p and player 2 selects cea). In this
respect, our evidence shows that these strategy proﬁles occur only marginally. That is to say,
if a particular rule dictates the game allocation, it is because the same rule is supported by a
Nash equilibrium of the corresponding procedure.9
Procedures Framed Sessions Unframed Sessions
P1 400 .97 0 0 .03 800 .96 .01 .01 .03
P2 400 0 .98 .01 .01 800 .01 .98 .01 0
P3 400 0 0 .97 .03 800 .01 0 .96 .03
Allocations Obs. cea p cel Others Obs. cea p cel Others
(6)
Table 6: Outcome distributions of P1,P 2 and P3.
We now look at subjects’ aggregate behavior in Table 7, which reports the relative fre-
quencies with which pivotal players (player 3 in P1, player 2 in P2 and player 1 in P3) used
9Relative frequencies of Nash equilibria strategy proﬁles of (un)framed sessions of procedures P1,P 2 and P3
are .96 (.94), .99 (.98) and .93 (.9) respectively. We should also notice that, in procedures P1 and P3, a Nash
equilibrium occurs if either a) the pivotal player selects the equilibrium rule (p =1 /3 if she plays randomly) or
b) in the case of her not doing so (this, under random playing, would occur with a probability of 1−p =2 /3) if
the other two players select the equilibrium rule (probability equal to 1/9). As for P2, a strategy proﬁle is not
a Nash equilibrium if 2 and 3 play C (which, under random playing, would occur with a probability of 1/9)
or when players 1 and 2 play A (which, under random playing, would occur again with a probability of 1/9).
The expected probability of a Nash equilibrium under random playing is, therefore, 1/3+2 /3 ∗ 1/9 ∼ = .4. in
procedures P1 and P3 and 1 − 2/9 ∼ = .75 in procedure P2. This implies that relative frequencies of equilibrium
strategy proﬁles are much higher than their predicted values under random playing.
14each strategy in the corresponding procedure. As Table 7 shows, pivotal players overwhelm-
ingly use their weakly dominant strategies (relative frequencies in boldface), both in framed
and unframed sessions. This conﬁrms that compliance with equilibrium is high in normal-form
games that are solvable in just one round with the deletion of weakly dominated strategies
(e.g., Costa-Gomes et al, 2001).10
Pivotal player Player 3 (P1) Player 2 (P2) Player 1 (P3)
Framed .97 .02 .1 .1 .73 .17 .04 .07 .89
Unframed .94 .03 .03 .07 .84 .09 .02 .09 .89
RULES cea p cel cea p cel cea p cel
(7)
Table 7: Aggregate behavior of pivotal players in the sessions of P1,P 2 and P3.
4.2 The majority procedure P0
We now focus on P0, whose outcome distributions are reported in Table 8. Consistently with
the layout of Tables 6-7, Table 8 partitions our observations of P0 into two groups: “framed”
and “unframed”, independently on the actual frame under which they were collected (treat-
ments T1-T3 of Table 1), or, for the unframed sessions, the sequencing of procedures P1 − P3
(treatments T4-T8).11 As Table 8 shows, the proportional rule is salient in describing the al-
location distributions, for both framed and unframed sessions. Subjects not only managed to
agree on an equilibrium allocation a signiﬁcant number of times, but they did so only by way
of the proportional rule, as coordination on cea or cel does not exceed 3% of total observations.
Moreover, we also observe a much higher frequency of coordination (and, therefore, a lower
frequency of non-equilibrium allocations) in the framed sessions and/or later periods. This is
indicating that both learning and frames appear to enhance coordination (on the proportional
rule).12
10As far as non-pivotal players are concerned, weakly dominant strategies are again more frequently selected,
although not as frequently as in the case of pivotal players (see Herrero et al. (2003) for details).
11This partitioning is justiﬁed by the fact that we cannot detect signiﬁcant diﬀerences in (proportional)
outcome distributions in P0 -using Mann-Whitney non-parametric tests- within framed (z =-0.885, p= 0.3763)
or unframed ( z =1.276, p= 0.2020) sessions. Analogous considerations hold when we look at aggregate behavior,
disaggregated for player position (Table 11). Results are not reported here, but are available upon request.
12This ﬁrst impression is conﬁrmed by testing the diﬀerence of proportional outcomes between framed and
unframed sessions (Mann-Whitney: z = −10.289,p= 0). Again, analogous considerations hold when we look
at aggregate behavior, disaggregated for player position.
15Rounds Framed Sessions Unframed Sessions
First 10 600 .01 .55 .01 .43 400 .04 .28 0 .68
Last 10 600 0 .89 0 .11 400 0 .66 .01 .34
Obs. cea p cel Others Obs. cea p cel Others
(8)
Table 8: Outcome distributions in P0.
The evidence of Table 8 calls for further statistical analysis. In particular, we are interested
in checking the extent to which frame and learning eﬀects (basically absent in P1,P 2 and P3) are
signiﬁcant in explaining subjects’ coordination on the proportional rule in P0, and whether one
eﬀects predominates over the other.
In the regressions that follow the dependent variable ys(t) ∈ {0,1} is an index which equals
1 if, at any given round t of P0, i) at the group level, all members of group s are able to
coordinate on the equilibrium corresponding to the proportional rule (Table 9) or, ii) at the
individual level, subject s selects p as her current strategy (Table 11). For both regressions,
we shall assume that the corresponding probabilities distribute according to the classic logit
model:
Pr[ys(t) = 1] =
ef(.)
1+ef(.),
where f(.) is a linear function of treatment conditions.13 Since, within each session, the same
group of 12 subjects is randomly rematched each of the 20 rounds, we also adjust the estimation
of the variance-covariance matrices to control for possible correlation among observations drawn
from the same session.
(9)
Table 9: Testing for frame and learning eﬀects in P0 at the outcome level
Table 9 reports the estimated coeﬃcient of a logit regression in which f(.) includes a constant
term (Const. in the table), a dummy variable (Frame), which equals 1 (0) for a framed (un-
framed) session, another dummy variable (Last10) which equals 1 (0) for observation drawn in
the last (ﬁrst) 10 rounds, together with an interaction term. Since the interaction term intro-
duce non linearity in the measurement of both frame and learning eﬀects, the last two rows of
Table 9 report marginal eﬀects evaluated at the sample means of the corresponding regressors.
Table 9 conﬁrms the impression we drew from Table 10: frame and learning eﬀects are both
highly signiﬁcant in explaining convergence to the proportional rule outcome. Although the
estimated learning marginal eﬀect is higher, the diﬀerence (here and elsewhere in this section)
is not statistically signiﬁcant (p=.393).
13All regressions were numerically evaluated using Stata 10, by StataCorp.
16Table 10 shows aggregate behavior in P0, for frame and unframed sessions, disaggregated
for rounds and player position. Again, Table 10 our observations are partitioned in the usual
four subsamples.
Player 1 Player 2 Player 3
Framed - First 10 .05 .8 .15 .09 .82 .09 .25 .72 .03
Framed - Last 10 0 .98 .02 .02 .97 .01 .06 .93 .01
Unframed - First 10 .19 .55 .26 .17 .71 .12 .35 .54 .11
Unframed - Last 10 .04 .84 .12 .06 .93 .01 .23 .76 .01
RULES cea p cel cea p cel cea p cel
(10)
Table 10. Evolution of subjects’ aggregate behavior in P0.
Table 10 conﬁrms that subjects mainly select the proportional rule (boldface), independently
of their player positions, and that frequencies of use of p are higher in the framed sessions and
for observations which correspond to the last 10 rounds of each session. We also notice that
learning eﬀects (i.e., higher propensity to choose the proportional rule in the last rounds of
each sessions) are stronger in the unframed sessions, in that diﬀerences in the frequencies of
use between ﬁrst and last 10 rounds are higher. From Table 10, we see that player 2 (especially
in the framed sessions) starts playing p with higher probability than Players 1 and 3, while the
increase in probability across time intervals is comparatively lower. Also, frame eﬀects (that
is, an increase in the probability of playing p in the framed sessions) are lower for player 2
than for her opponents. Thus, the dynamic pattern we observe (especially in the unframed
sessions) mainly consists of players 1 and 3 gradually discarding their ﬁrst-best rule (cel and
cea respectively), “joining” player 2 in the choice of their second-best option.
Table 11 reports parameter estimations of a model speciﬁcation by which f(.) includes
dummies for player position (Pli in the table), and interactions of the latter with all regressors
included in Table 9.14
(11)
Table 11: Testing for frame and learning eﬀects in P0 at the individual level
From Table 11 we derive that player 2 starts oﬀ playing p signiﬁcantly more often than her
opponents, both in framed and unframed sessions.15 As for framing, marginal eﬀects are always
14Note that, since we introduce dummies for all player positions, the estimation of the constant is omitted
here.
15As for the unframed sessions, diﬀerence in the estimated player constants between Player 2 and her oppo-
nents are always positive and signiﬁcant, with z = 4.64 (p=0.000) and z = 4.02 (p =0.000), for Players 1 and
3, respectively. The same considerations hold for the framed sessions, although the diﬀerence is statistically
signiﬁcant in case of player 3 only (z =0.91, p =0.364 and z =2.71, p =0.007, respectively). Joint tests (where
17positive, although they are signiﬁcant (at the 5% conﬁdence level) for players 1 and 3 only. In
this sense, frames seem to facilitate Players 1 and 3 more than the middle-claimant Player 2 in
the task of coordination toward the proportional rule. By contrast, the increase in probability
in the last repetitions (measured by Pli Last10 for the unframed sessions and Pli Frame Last10
for the framed sessions) is the lowest (highest) for Player 2 in the (un)framed sessions. That is,
framing also enhances players’ 1 and 3 shift toward the proportional rule. Overall (look at the
marginal eﬀects, bottom of Table 11), learning is always highly signiﬁcant and increases with
player positions (although diﬀerences are never signiﬁcant).
These results complement the evidence of Table 10 we just discussed: player 1 (and especially
player 3, whose claim is signiﬁcantly smaller than the other two) gradually discard their favorite
options to join player 2 in selecting the proportional rule, with this movement being stronger
in the framed sessions. In other words, convergence to the proportional rule may have been
facilitated by some sort of median voter eﬀect, since the proportional rule is the only one
in which no player receives less than her second-best option. We shall further discuss some
alternative explanations for this behavioral pattern in the concluding remarks below.
5 Taking the viewpoint of outside observers: survey re-
sults
Our previous results concerning procedure P0 strongly suggest that the proportional rule shows
a particular strength as a coordinating device. In the axiomatic literature, rules are typically
justiﬁed on the grounds of properties reﬂecting ethical (or operational) criteria that they might
satisfy. Nevertheless, people may endorse diﬀerent criteria and therefore one might ask whether
it is the case that, in our problem, a majority of subjects perceives the proportional allocation
as being more just or socially appropriate than their alternatives. In doing so, we would be
exploring whether the proportional rule may be considered as a social norm for solving problems
of adjudicating conﬂicting claims. If such were the case, the choice of the proportional rule as
a coordinating device could be interpreted as evidence of the power of social norms to enhance
coordination and cooperation within a society [see, among others, Sugden (1986), Gauthier
(1986), Skyrms (1996) and Binmore (1998)]. Now, since we have also observed in our previous
results for P0 that frames help coordination, we should verify ﬁrst subjects’ perception of the
adequacy of the proportional rule (as the best way of solving problems of this sort) under
diﬀerent frames, even in the absence of strategic considerations.
To this aim, we adopted the usual approach applied for resource allocation problems, that
is, we asked subjects to answer a questionnaire adopting the perspective of an outside observer,
the null hypothesis is that Player 2 selects p with the same probability of Player 1 and Player 3 in the ﬁrst
rounds of framed and unframed sesisons are always rejected at the 1% conﬁdence level).
18rather than becoming involved in the problem as a claimant. This sort of survey was inspired by
the seminal paper presented by Yaari and Bar-Hillel (1984) and has been applied by Bar-Hillel
and Yaari (1993), Cuadras-Morat´ o et al. (2001) and G¨ achter and Riedl (2006), among others.
More speciﬁcally, we distributed 164 questionnaires among undergraduate students at the
University of Alicante and at the University of M´ alaga, none of whom had any prior exposure
to problems of adjudicating conﬂicting claims or any related issue. These students were not the
same ones who had been recruited for the experimental sessions in the lab. In the questionnaire,
we proposed six diﬀerent hypothetical situations leading to the same problem (c∗,E∗) used in
the experiment. Subjects were asked to select their preferred rule (among cea, p and cel) for
each individual problem in hand. The ﬁrst three situations were those that we presented as
Frames 1-3 in Section 3.2, while the remaining three situations are described as follows.16
• Frame 4: Estate division. A person dies and leaves an estate that is insuﬃcient to
cover the claims on three legally contracted debts. Then, E∗ is interpreted as the estate
and the claims vector c∗ as the debts contracted with each creditor.
• Frame 5: Bequests. A man dies after having promised each one of his three sons a
certain amount of money. The value of the bequest he leaves, however, is not suﬃcient to
cover the three promised amounts. His sons are now the claimants on the promises made
to them, individually, by their father.
• Frame 6: Taxation. The problem now consists of collecting a ﬁxed amount of money
(a tax in our case) from a given group of three agents whose gross incomes are known
to one another. As such, E∗ is interpreted as the amount to be collected and c∗ as the
vector of individual (gross) incomes.
Table 12 summarizes choice frequencies by our respondents under the six proposed frames.
FRAME cea p cel
F1: Depositors .06 .89 .05
F2: Shareholders .06 .68 .26
F3: NGOs .12 .46 .42
F4: Estate .15 .75 .10
F5: Bequests .38 .61 .01
F6: Taxation .11 .56 .33
(12)
Table 12. Questionnaire results
We ﬁrst observe from Table 12 that the respondents’ choices vary signiﬁcantly, depending
on the frame. Nevertheless, the proportional rule continues to be the solution that receives the
16See the Appendix for a complete description of the questionnaire.
19highest support in all six cases, not only at the aggregate level (as Table 12 shows) but also at
the level of individuals (since p represented the modal choice, across the six questions, for 90%
of responders). Furthermore, 16% of them chose the proportional rule in all six cases, where
no other rule was ever chosen, in all cases, by any respondent. If we restrict our attention
to the (minoritarian) rules cea and cel, we observe that they are chosen with diﬀerent rates
across frames, with a slight bias towards cel (19.2% vs. 14.8%, on average). As for the speciﬁc
frames, cea and cel are given almost identical support under frame 1 (in which the claimants
are depositors). Rule cea is preferred against cel under frames 4 and 5 (i.e., the heritage
situations), while cel is preferred in all other cases. Notice that cel was selected by 36% of the
respondents both under Frames 3 and 6 (non-governmental organizations and taxation). As for
Frame 3, our evidence is in keeping with the results presented by Cuadras-Morat´ o et al (2001),
in the context of health care problems, where cel receives a (slight) majoritarian support. This
evidence is consistent with the idea that cel is the appropriate solution when claims are related
to needs. The support for cel under Frame 6 (taxation), also responds to the idea of income
related to needs: people with low income should contribute relatively less, and thus, taxation
schemes should be progressive.17 The relatively large support of cea under Frame 5 (34%) may
be due to an interpretation of bequests more in line with the Spanish tradition, in which a
signiﬁcant part of the estate is distributed equally among the children.
In Table 13 we perform the statistical analysis to test for the impact of frames on the
respondents’ rule distributions.
F1 F2 F3 F4 F5
F2 18.1 (0)
F3 53.6 (0) 14.6 (.001)
F4 7.42 (.02) 13.6 (.001) 32.5 (0)
F5 37.7 (0) 54.8 (0) 60.4 (0) 21.3 (0)
F6 34.5 (0) 5.14 (.08) 2.75 (.25) 19.1 (0) 51.7 (0)
(13)
Table 13: Testing for frame eﬀects on the survey’s rule distributions
Each cell of Table 13 contains the associated χ2 test-statistics (p-value within parenthesis),
where the null hypothesis is no diﬀerence between the rule distributions of the corresponding
frame pairs.18 As Table 13 shows, all pairwise comparisons reject the null, with one sole
exception, Frame 3 vs. 6, we have just discussed. This conﬁrms our experimental evidence:
frames matter and our subjective sense of justice is sensitive to the context in which the claim
problem is posed. This consideration notwithstanding, also when facing the problem as outside
17See Ju and Moreno-Ternero (2008) for the precise link between progressive taxation and inequality reduction
in this context.
18There is no need of discarding observations here, since we have, for each subject, one decision per frame.
20observers, the proportional rule seems salient to characterize the most appropriate solution to
the range of proposed claim situations.
6 Conclusions
In this paper, we have studied problems of adjudicating conﬂicting claims from two distinct, but
complementary, perspectives. We believe our work may have implications for solving a variety
of problems involving conﬂicting claims, ranging from common daily-life situations (such as
allocating the cost of a public good among a group of neighbors) to more ambitious goals (such
as providing a device for lawmakers in charge of designing rules to solve distributional conﬂicts
in the presence of acquired rights). As for our experimental results, we can conﬁdently conclude
that, when the rules of a procedure are speciﬁcally designed to induce a particular (equilibrium)
behavior, subjects are perfectly capable of recognizing the underlying incentive structure and
selecting the corresponding equilibrium allocation. This claim is supported by the fact that the
majority of our subjects, commenting on how they played procedures P1 −P3 in the lab, made
very similar remarks:
• “In P3 everything was determined by my own choice.”19
As the quote suggests, this is far more evident for pivotal players, who can force the outcome
of a game in their own favor by selecting their weakly dominant strategy.
As for the majority procedure P0, and in stark contrast with the other procedures, coordina-
tion on the proportional solution overwhelmingly prevails. Furthermore, in this case, framing
and (especially) learning eﬀects signiﬁcantly enhance coordination. Similar conclusions can
be drawn from our survey results. Here again, the proportional rule is the one that receives
stronger support, both at the aggregate and at the individual levels. Again, we look at subjects’
comments to ﬁnd some explanation for such a clear-cut result:
• “At ﬁrst, I was looking for a way of maximizing my payoﬀ but then I realized that it was
quite impossible to do so, as everyone else was acting the same way and we were all losing
money. So we ﬁnally settled for an intermediate solution that was neither our best nor
our worst option.”20
• “I chose the option that seemed to be the most equitable one for the three agents involved.”
21
19Debrieﬁng section of Session 7 (unframed). Subject # 4 (player 1).
20Debrieﬁng section of Session 1 (framed). Subject # 9 (player 3).
21Debrieﬁng section of Session 1 (framed). Subject # 10 (player 3).
21These two quotes suggest two diﬀerent, but complementary, explanations for the coordinat-
ing power of the proportional rule. First, notice that the proportional rule tends, in general,
to favor middle-sized claimants and, therefore, to ease coordination when the rule choice is
made by majority voting (as is the case for our procedure P0).22 Nonetheless, this median voter
eﬀect we already referred to may also have been enhanced, as the second quote suggests, by
the ”social norm property” of the proportional rule we observe from our survey results. In this
sense, subjects’ moral judgements may have acted as coordinating device, exactly where incen-
tives did not provide a clear-cut solution to the coordination problem subjects were facing. Not
surprisingly, this eﬀect is stronger in the framed sessions, where moral considerations are easier
to apply.23
It is quite probable that some other factors may have inﬂuenced the coordination pattern.
First, if the median voter eﬀect we just mentioned were the only one at play, we should not
expect strong framing eﬀects, since the same argument holds for both framed and unframed
treatments. However, we observe from Tables 9-11 that framing eﬀects do occur. Even if
players seem sensitive to frames to a diﬀerent extent, the overall eﬀect, both at the aggregate
and the individual level, is always signiﬁcant.
To conclude, we may alert the reader that we focus on a very speciﬁc claim problem, which
may have inﬂuenced our results in many diﬀerent ways we cannot properly control for. For
example, we focused on a single claim problem (c∗,E) with the (non-generic) property by which
the proportional solution corresponds to the ﬁrst-best for the middle claimant and the second-
best for the others. This may have certainly enhanced the median voter eﬀect we just mentioned.
On the other hand, other classic justiﬁcations, often invoked to explain experimental evidence
on coordination games, may fall short (or their application may not be straightforward) in our
case. This is, for example, the case of the Pareto dominance criterion, given that all three rules
are equally eﬃcient. By the same token, also risk dominance cannot directly be applied to our
context, since our games always employ more than two players and two strategies. Moreover, if
22By a similar argument, another explanation might be related to the properties that the proportional solution
enjoys, in particular, its immunity to strategic manipulations. In this respect, Ju, Miyagawa and Sakai (2007)
have shown that the proportional rule is essentially the only rule that is immune to the manipulation via
reshuﬄing, or via merging and splitting, agents’ claims.
23The wording ”equitable” we read on many debrieﬁng questionnaire may suggest, as one referee commented,
that subjects’ inequality aversion may have driven the equilibrium selection process in the direction of the pro-
portional rule. To this aim, we analyzed P0 within the realm of Fehr and Schmidt’s (1999) classic formalization.
Clearly, nothing changes if we look at the Nash equilibria of P0, independently on how individual preference
parameters of envy and guilt are speciﬁed. This is because P0 is a strict coordination game. However, it is no
longer true that all equilibria are equally eﬃcient (at least under the assumption of transferable utility). In
this respect, we found that, if interdependent utility parameters are constant across players, and eﬃciency of
an equilibrium is measured by simply summing the three players’ net payoﬀs, cel is the most preferred rule,
followed by p and cea. On the other hand, if we look at net transfer (i.e., we do not substract claim to monetary
payoﬀs) the preference ranking is reversed.
22we apply the maximin criterion as a proxy for risk-dominance, again, we are not able to select
among the three equilibria, since out-of-equilibrium punishment does not depend on claims.
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257 Appendix 1. Proofs
7.1 Proof of Proposition 1
In this section, we address the convergence of procedures P1, P2 and P3 when they are applied
to arbitrary rule sets. We show that, for all of the three procedures, whenever the process does
not terminate in a ﬁnite number of stages, then the limit case is always well deﬁned.
7.1.1 Convergence of P1
Let (c,E) ∈ B be a given problem. Let r = {rj}j∈N be the proﬁle of rules chosen by the agents
to solve the problem, where rj ∈ R for all j ∈ N. For the sake of simplicity in the proof we
assume that all of the chosen rules are continuous with respect to claims.24
Fix i ∈ N and consider the sequence {ck







i(ck,E)}, for all k ≥ 2.
Since rj ∈ R for all j ∈ N, it is straightforward to show that {ck
i}k∈N is weakly decreasing and
bounded from below by 0. Thus, it is convergent. Let xi = limk→∞ ck
i and x =( xi)i∈N. Thus,








k,E)}, for all i ∈ N.





i(x,E)}, for all i ∈ N.
Note that, since c1 ≥ c2 ≥ ... ≥ cn, it is straightforward to show that ck
1 ≥ ck
2 ≥ ... ≥ ck
n for all





1 (x,E). Thus, since r ∈ R,
0=x1 − r
j0
1 (x,E) ≥ xi − r
j0
i (x,E) ≥ 0, for all i ∈ N.
In other words, x = rj0(x,E), which implies
￿
xi = E. ￿
7.1.2 Convergence of P2
Let (c,E) ∈ B be a given problem. Let r = {rj}j∈N be the proﬁle of rules chosen by the agents
for solving the problem, where rj ∈ R for all j ∈ N.
24This mild requirement is satisﬁed by all standard rules in the literature on bankruptcy. In particular, it is
satisﬁed by the three rules that we consider in our experiment.
26For all i ∈ N, consider the sequences {(ck
i,Ek,m k
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which proves the convergence. ￿
7.1.3 Convergence of P3
Let (c,E) ∈ B be a given problem. Let r = {rj}j∈N be the proﬁle of rules chosen by the agents
to solve the problem, where rj ∈ R for all j ∈ N.
For all i ∈ N, consider the sequences {(ck
i,Ek,m k





























































Now, it is straightforward to show that c2
1 ≥ c2
i for all i ∈ N. Then, since rj ∈ R for all
j ∈ N, then rj
n(c2,E2) ≥ E2









n . By iterating this
procedure we have the following:
E2 = E −
￿
i∈N m1
i ≤ (1 − 1
n) · E
E3 = E −
￿
i∈N m2
i ≤ (1 − 1
n) · E2 ≤ (1 − 1
n)2 · E
...
Ek+1 = E −
￿
i∈N mk
i ≤ (1 − 1
n) · Ek ≤ ... ≤ (1 − 1
n)k · E


























i = E. ￿
277.2 The claims problem
All of the four procedures played in each of the experimental sessions were constructed upon
the same claims problem, where c∗ = (49, 46, 5) (i.e.,
￿
ci = 100) and E∗ = 20. The resulting










It is straightforward to show that, for every three-agent problem (c,E) ∈ B in which c1 ≥ c2 ≥










3 if c1 ≤ E +2 c3 − c2
c2−c1+E
2 if E +2 c3 − c2 <c 1 <E+ c2











2 if E − 2c2 <c 3 < E
3
c2 if c3 ≥ E − 2c2
.
As we have already mentioned earlier, the main reason for choosing the particular problem
(c∗,E∗) was to provide each claimant with a strictly preferred allocation associated with one








We also wanted to avoid a solution in which the two claimants with lower claims receive nothing.

























We opted for the ﬁrst one in order to avoid ceaj = ceai for all i ￿= j. All together, it says






































28It is straightforward to show that the problem presented above satisﬁes all these inequalities.
8 Appendix 2. Instructions
8.1 Instructions for the experiments
We shall now present the instructions given for the experiments, but only for Sessions 1 and 7.
The remaining sessions go along the same lines, except for some diﬀerences that are explained
in footnotes.
8.1.1 Instructions for a Framed Session (Session 1)
Screen 1: Welcome to the Experiment
We are going to study how people interact in a bankruptcy situation. We are only interested
in knowing how the average person reacts, so no record will be kept on how any individual
subject behaves. Please do not feel that any particular sort of behavior is expected of you.
On the other hand, keep also in mind that your behavior will aﬀect the sum of money you
may win during the course of this experiment.
On the following pages you will ﬁnd a series of instructions explaining how the experiment
works and how to use the computer during the experiment.
HELP: When you are ready to continue, please click on the OK button
Screen 2: How you can make money
• You will be playing two sessions of 20 rounds each. In each round of every session, you
and other two participants in this room will be assigned to a GROUP. In each round,
each person in the group has to make a decision. Your decisions, and those decision of
the other two people in your group will determine how much money you (and the other)
win for that round.
• At the beginning of each round, the computer randomly selects the three members of
each group.
• Remember that the members of your group WILL CHANGE AT EVERY ROUND.
• To begin, you will be given 500 pesetas each to participate in the experiment.25 Further-
more, at the beginning of each session, an initial endowment of 1000 pesetas will be given
to you.
25This sentence did not appear in the case of Player 3.
29• Please note that the computer assigns a PLAYER’S NUMBER to each participant (1, 2
or 3). This number appears in the upper right-hand corner of your screen and indicates
the type of player you are and will be throughout the experiment. There are three types
of players, and each group will be composed of one player of each type. Even when your
group changes, you will still continue to be the same type of player.
• In the course of each round, you will have to pay out some money. The amount will depend
on the decisions you make as well as on the decisions made by the other two members
of group. The amount you need to pay out during each round will be taken from your
initial endowment for that round but will be added to your TOTAL PAY-OFF for that
session. Remember that in this experiment, payoﬀs are such that, REGARDLESS OF
THE CIRCUMSTANCES, YOU ALWAYS WIN MONEY.
• At the end of the experiment you will receive the TOTAL sum of money you obtained
for all of the sessions, plus the show-up fee of 500 pesetas.26
When you are quite ready to proceed, please click on the OK button.
Screen 3: The First Game (I)
Background: A bank goes bankrupt and a judge has to decide on how the sum of money
obtained from its liquidation would best be divided among its creditors. In this ﬁrst experiment,
you and all of the other participants in the experiment are the bank’s creditors who have taken
their claims to court in an eﬀort to retrieve as much of it as they can.
In other words, for this session only, you, the creditors, are depositors with accounts in the
bankrupt company.27 That is to say, you are people who have savings accounts with the bank.
You now have to come to an agreement (with the other two creditors in your group) on the
percentage of the liquidation value that should be given to each of you. Obviously, as the bank
has gone bankrupt, the sum of your claims, (i.e., the sum of your deposits), is much higher
than the liquidation funds available.
During each round, you will try to retrieve as much of your claim as possible, which, in turn,
will determine your losses, (i.e., the diﬀerence between your claim and the amount you receive
at the beginning of each round). The sum of your losses will be subtracted from your initial
endowments, and what is left, will be considered to be your TOTAL payoﬀ for that particular
session.
26In the case of Player 3: At the end of the experiment you will receive the TOTAL sum of money you were
allotted in each session.
27This is the case of Frame 1. In the case of Frame 2 (3), however, the creditors are now shareholders of the
bank (non-governmental organizations that are, at least partially, supported by the bank’s proﬁts).
30Concerning the problem involving you and the other two persons in your group, your claims





The liquidation value is 20.
As you can clearly see, there is not enough liquidation funds available to satisfy all of your
claims.
Remember that the Player’s Number assigned to you (1, 2 or 3) appears on the computer
screen and will be there throughout the experiment.
From the many diﬀerent options the judge has available to him with regard to how the
liquidation value should be shared out, he decides that you, the creditors, must choose from
among the following three rules:
1. RULE A: Divide the liquidation value equally among the creditors under the condition
that no one gets more than her original claim. In other words, this rule beneﬁts the agent
with the lowest claim.
2. RULE B: Divide the liquidation value proportionally, according to the size of the claims.
3. RULE C: Losses should be divided as equal as possible among the three creditors, subject
to the condition that all agents receive something non-negative from the liquidation value.
In other words, this rule beneﬁts the agent with the highest claim.
For the problem facing you and your group, the allocations awarded by each of the above
rules are as follows:
A ≡ (7.5,7.5,5); B ≡ (9.8,9.2,1); C ≡ (11.5,8.5,0).
For instance, rule B divides the liquidation value in three parts, assigning 9.8 to Player 1, 9.2
to Player 2 and 1 to Player 3.
Screen 4: The First Game (II)
The structure of this game is as follows:
Your decision, and the decisions of the members of your group will determine the division
of the liquidation value, as it is shown in the payoﬀ matrices. Note that if you all agree on the
same rule, then the division of the liquidation value is exactly the one you propose.
31This is how the matrices should be read: There are three tables with nine cells each one:
Player 1 chooses the row, Player 2 chooses the column and Player 3 chooses the table. Each
cell contains three numbers. The ﬁrst number is the amount of money that Player 1 will lose
if that particular cell is chosen. The second number is the amount that Player 2 loses and the
third number is how much Player 3 would lose. For further clarity, consider the upper left cell,
for example. This cell is chosen if all 3 players choose Rule A, and division of the liquidation
funds will therefore be done as Rule A proposes, i.e., (7.5,7.5,5). As such, and taking the
above claims into account, Player 1 loses 7.5 − 49 = −41.5, which is the ﬁrst number in that
particular cell. Player 2, therefore, loses 7.5 − 46 = −38.5, and Player 3 loses 5 − 5 = 0 .
To summarize,
• You will be playing 20 times with ever-changing group members.
• At the beginning of each round, the computer will select the members of your group at
random;
• At the beginning of each round, you and the other two members of your group will have
to choose one of the three rules available to you (A, B or C). Your choice (and those of
the other members of your group) will determine how much money will be subtracted
from your initial endowments, according to the corresponding table in front of you.
To choose an option, simply click on the corresponding letter. Once you have done so,
please conﬁrm your choice by clicking on the OK button.
Screen 5: The Second Game.
You will now play 20 rounds of the next game. In this session, just as in the previous one,
you, the creditors, are the bank’s depositors.28 That is to say, people who have deposited money
in accounts at the bank. As you will notice, on your computer screen, neither the players’ claims
nor the liquidation value have changed. Just as before, you must arrive at an agreement with
the other members of your group on how the liquidation value should be divided among you.
Remember that, just as before, 1000 pesetas will be assigned to you at the beginning of the
session.
The instructions for this session are almost identical to the ones for the previous game, but
with a few little modiﬁcations. In each round, as before, you must choose from among Rules
A, B and C. If you all agree on the same rule, the division of the liquidation value will be
done exactly as you propose. If only two of you agree on a rule then, those two get the share
28This is the case of Frame 1. In the case of Frame 2 (3) the creditors are shareholders (non-governmental
organizations which are, at least, partially, supported by the bank) rather than depositors.
32proposed by that rule and the creditor who does not agree with the division, not only loses
her whole claim, but also pays a ﬁxed penalty of 1 peseta. Finally, if all of you disagree on
the proposed sharing, you will all lose your claims and pay the ﬁxed penalty of 1 peseta. The
allocations that correspond to each possible situation are shown in the payoﬀ matrices below.
The matrices are to be read exactly as before. If we consider the lower left cell, for instance,
this is the cell that will be selected when Players 2 and 3 choose A and Player 1 chooses C. In
this particular case, player 1 loses −1−49 = −50, which is the upper number of that particular
cell. Similarly, Player 2 loses 7.5 − 46 = −38.5, and Player 3 loses 5 − 5 = 0.
To choose an action, you simply have to click on the corresponding letter. Once you have
done so, please conﬁrm your choice by clicking on the OK button.
8.1.2 Instructions for an Unframed Session (Session 7)
Screen 1: Welcome to the Experiment
It is designed to study how people interact in claims situations. We are only interested in
what the average does and not how any individual subject behaves, so no record will be kept of
anyone’s individual behavior. Please do not feel that any particular behavior is expected from
you.
On the other hand, keep also in mind that your behavior will aﬀect the sum of money you
may win during the course of this experiment.
On the following pages you will ﬁnd a series of instructions explaining how the experiment
works and how to use the computer during the experiment.
When you are ready to continue, please click on the OK button
Screen 2: How you can make money
• You will be playing four sessions of 20 rounds each. In each round, for all sessions, you
and other two persons in this room will be assigned to a GROUP. In each round, each
person in the group will have to make a decision. Your decision (and the decision of the
other two persons in your group) will determine how much money you (and the other)
win for that round.
• At the beginning of each round, the computer will randomly select the members of your
group.
• Remember that the members of your group CHANGE AT THE END OF EACH ROUND.
• You will receive 1000 pesetas for participating in this experiment.29 Furthermore, at the
beginning of each session, an initial endowment of 1000 pesetas will also be given to you.
29This sentence was not included in the case of Player 3.
33• Please note that the computer assigns a PLAYER’S NUMBER to each participant (1, 2
or 3). This number appears in the upper right-hand corner of your screen and indicates
the type of player you are and will be throughout the experiment. There are three types
of players, and each group will be composed of one player of each type. Even when your
group changes, you will still continue to be the same type of player.
• In the course of each round, you will have to pay out some money. The amount will depend
on the decisions you make as well as on the decisions made by the other two members
of group. The amount you need to pay out during each round will be taken from your
initial endowment for that round but will be added to your TOTAL PAY-OFF for that
session. Remember that in this experiment, payoﬀs are such that, REGARDLESS OF
THE CIRCUMSTANCES, YOU ALWAYS WIN MONEY.
• At the end of the experiment, you will receive the TOTAL sum of money you obtained
for all of the sessions, plus the show-up fee of 1000 pesetas.30
When you are ready to continue, please click on the OK button.
Screen 3: The First Game.31
At the beginning of each round, the computer will randomly select the members of your
group.
During each round, you and the other two members of your group must choose among three
possible decisions: A, B and C.
Your decision, and those of the other two members of your group will determine how much
money you lose from your initial endowment in this session, as is shown in the payoﬀ matrices.
This is how the matrices should be read: There are three tables with nine cells each: Player
1 chooses the row, Player 2 the column, and Player 3 chooses the table. Each cell contains three
numbers. The ﬁrst number is the amount of money that Player 1 will lose if that particular cell
is chosen. The second number is the amount that Player 2 loses and the third number is how
much Player 3 would lose. For further clarity, consider the lower left cell, for example. This
cell is chosen when Player 1 chooses C and Players 2 and 3 choose A. If all 3 players choose
Rule A, and the division of the liquidation funds will therefore be done as Rule A proposes,
i.e., (7.5,7.5,5). As such, and taking the above claims into account, Player 1 loses 41.5, which
is the ﬁrst number of that particular cell. Player 2 loses −38.5, and Player 3 loses 0.
To summarize,
30In the case of Player 3: At the end of the experiment you will receive the TOTAL sum of money you were
allotted in each session.
31This was the third game in Sessions 9 and 10 and the second game in Sessions 11 and 12.
34• You will be playing 20 times, with ever-changing group members.
• At the beginning of each round, the computer will select the members of your group at
random;
• At the beginning of each round, you and the other two members of your group will have
to choose one of the three rules available to you (A, B or C). Your choice (and those of
the other members of your group) will determine how much money will be subtracted
from your initial endowments, according to the corresponding table in front of you.
To choose an action, you simply click on the corresponding letter. Once you have done so,
please conﬁrm your choice by clicking on the OK button.
Screen 4: The Second Game.32
You will now play 20 additional rounds of the following game. The instructions are identical
to those given for the previous game, with a few little modiﬁcations. The only diﬀerence is in
the payoﬀ matrices.
For further clarity, consider the lower left cell, for example. This cell is chosen if Players 2
and 3 choose A and Player 1 chooses C. In this case, Player 1 loses −39.2, which is the upper
number of that particular cell. Player 2 loses −36.8, and Player 3 loses −4.
HELP: To choose an action, you simply click on the corresponding letter. Once you have
done so, please conﬁrm your choice by clicking on the OK button.
Screen 5: The Third Game.33
You will now play 20 additional rounds of the following game. The instructions are the
same as for the previous game. The only diﬀerence is in the payoﬀ matrices.
Consider the lower left cell, for instance. This cell is selected when Players 2 and 3 choose
A, and Player 1 chooses C. In this case, Player 1 loses −37.5, which is the upper number of
that particular cell. Player 2 loses −37.5, and Player 3 loses −5.
HELP: To choose an action, you simply click on the corresponding letter. Once you have
done so, please conﬁrm your choice by clicking on the OK button.
Screen 6: The Fourth Game.
You will now play 20 additional rounds of the following game. The instructions are the
same as for the previous game. The only diﬀerence is in the payoﬀ matrices.
Consider the lower left cell, for instance. This cell is selected when Players 2 and 3 choose
A, and Player 1 chooses C. In this case, Player 1 loses −50, which is the upper number of that
particular cell. Similarly, Player 2 loses −38.5, and Player 3 loses 0.
32This was the ﬁrst game in Sessions 11 and 12.
33This was the ﬁrst game in Sessions 9 and 10.
35HELP: To choose an action, you simply click on the corresponding letter. Once you have
done so, please conﬁrm your choice by clicking on the OK button.
8.2 The questionnaire
• The ﬁrst problem
Background: A bank goes bankrupt and a judge has to decide on how the sum of money
obtained from its liquidation would best be divided among its creditors. Obviously, as the bank
has gone bankrupt, the sum of creditors’ claims, (i.e., the sum of their deposits), is much higher
than the liquidation funds available. The claims and the available liquidation value, are shown





The liquidation value is 20.
The judge has three diﬀerent options available to him with regard to how the liquidation value
should be shared out. They are the following three rules:
1. RULE A: Divide the liquidation value equally among the three creditors, on the condition
that no one gets more than her original claim. In other words, this rule beneﬁts the agent
with the lowest claim.
2. RULE B: Divide the liquidation value proportionately, according to the size of the claims.
3. RULE C: Losses should be divided as equal as possible among the three creditors, subject
to the condition that all agents receive a ‘non-negative’ amount from the liquidation funds.
In other words, this rule beneﬁts the agent with the highest claim.
For the problem in hand, the allocations awarded by each of the above rules are as follows:
A ≡ (7.5,7.5,5); B ≡ (9.8,9.2,1); C ≡ (11.5,8.5,0).
For instance, Rule B divides the liquidation value in three parts, assigning 9.8 to Creditor 1,
9.2 to Creditor 2 and 1 to Creditor 3.
What would your choice be if you were the judge?
• The second problem
In the second problem, the claimants are all shareholders of the bank, rather than depositors.
What would your choice be if you were the judge?
36• The third problem
In the third problem, claimants are all non-governmental organizations sponsored by the
bank. Each claimant had signed a contract with the bank, before its bankruptcy, that stated that
they would receive a contribution in accordance with their social standing (i.e., the higher their
social standing, the higher the contributions they received). Thus, “Doctors without frontiers”,
for instance, should receive the highest endowment, “Save the children” the second highest, and
“Friends of Real Betis Balompi´ e” the least of all. The judge must now decide on the amounts
that they should each obtain.
What sort of distribution would you decide on if you were the judge?
• The fourth problem
A man dies leaving three debts. Let the liquidation value in the table above be the estate
that he leaves and let the claims be the debts contracted with each creditor.
What sort of distribution would you decide on if you were the judge?
• The ﬁfth problem
In the ﬁfth problem, a man dies after having promised a certain amount of money to each
of his three sons. The value of the bequest, however, is not enough to cover all of his promises.
Thus, his sons are now the claimants and their claims are on the promises their father had
made to each of them.
What sort of distribution would you decide on if you were the judge?
• The sixth problem
In this case, the situation is diﬀerent. The problem now consists of collecting a certain sum
of money from a group of three agents whose gross incomes are known to one another. The
amount to be collected can be interpreted as a tax. More precisely, their individual incomes





The amount to be collected is 20.
For this problem, we consider three diﬀerent tax schemes, which are the following:
A ≡ (7.5,7.5,5); B ≡ (9.8,9.2,1); C ≡ (11.5,8.5,0).
37Each one clearly states the amount that each agent must pay for the total amount to be
successfully collected. For instance, rule B forces Agent 1 to pay 9.8, Agent 2 to pay 9.2 and
Agent 3 to pay 1.
Which scheme would you choose if you were the person in charge of levying the tax?
38Coef. Std. Err. P>z [95% Conf. Interval]
Frame 1,139 0,419 0,007 0,318 1,960
Last10 1,585 0,260 0,000 1,074 2,095
Frame*Last10 0,290 0,391 0,458 -0,476 1,055
Const. -0,938 0,327 0,004 -1,579 -0,298
dP/dFrame 1,284 0,518 0,013 0,268 2,300
dP/dLast10 1,759 0,203 0,000 1,360 2,157
Tab. 9
Coef. Std. Err. P>z [95% Conf. Interval]
Pl1 0,201 0,292 0,491 -0,371 0,772
Pl2 0,877 0,252 0,000 0,384 1,370
Pl3 0,150 0,160 0,347 -0,163 0,464
Pl1_Frame 1,210 0,367 0,001 0,491 1,929
Pl2_Frame 0,647 0,343 0,060 -0,026 1,320
Pl3_Frame 0,800 0,329 0,015 0,155 1,444
Pl1_Last10 1,439 0,201 0,000 1,044 1,834
Pl2_Last10 1,729 0,176 0,000 1,384 2,074
Pl3_Last10 1,016 0,285 0,000 0,458 1,575
Pl1_Frame_Last10 0,985 0,485 0,042 0,035 1,935
Pl2_Frame_Last10 0,075 0,341 0,826 -0,594 0,744
Pl3_Frame_Last10 0,694 0,514 0,177 -0,313 1,700
Player 1 1,702 0,523 0,001 0,676 2,728
Player 2 0,685 0,396 0,084 -0,092 1,461
Player 3 1,147 0,496 0,021 0,175 2,118
Player 1 2,030 0,276 0,000 1,488 2,572
Player 2 1,774 0,189 0,000 1,403 2,144
Player 3 1,432 0,281 0,000 0,882 1,982
Tab. 11
FRAME
LEARNING